This study investigated the relationship between concussions and medication adherence among 247 adults experiencing homelessness in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, who were prescribed medication for a psychiatric disorder. Participants were asked whether they had “ever experienced a blow to the head that caused a concussion,” and medication adherence was measured by asking participants whether they had taken their psychiatric medication yesterday. The data were analyzed using univariate and multivariable logistic regressions. Results showed that more than half of the sample had a (...) concussion history, and homeless adults with a concussion history had higher odds of non-adherence to psychiatric medications compared with those who reported no concussion history [OR = 2.13 ]. Findings suggest that medication non-adherence is associated with incurred concussions. Raising awareness among service providers of the relationship between traumatic brain injury and medication adherence may increase efforts to improve adherence in this underserved population. (shrink)

Bioethicists have long been concerned that seriously ill patients entering early phase (‘phase I’) treatment trials are motivated by therapeutic benefit even though the likelihood of benefit is low. In spite of these concerns, consent forms for phase I studies involving seriously ill patients generally employ indeterminate benefit statements rather than unambiguous statements of unlikely benefit. This seeming mismatch between attitudes and actions suggests a need to better understand research ethics committee members’ attitudes toward communication of potential benefits and risks (...) of early phase studies to potential subjects. We surveyed the members of two U.S. research ethics committees using a phase I gene transfer study scenario, and compared the results to a previous survey of potential subjects’ perceptions and attitudes toward benefit and risk for the same protocol. The results show that there is indeed a gap between the subjects’ perceptions and the committee members’ views on what is appropriate to be communicated to research subjects. This discrepancy is the product of both the commonly assumed optimism of the subjects and to a “protective pessimism” of the research ethics committee members. We discuss this discrepancy using “frameworks of trust” and demonstrate the need to incorporate these frameworks into the existing model of informed consent. (shrink)

Valuemetrics is an elaboration of Robert S. Hartman's innovative development in the application of an abstract system to the study of ethical problems. The system used for this purpose is a branch of logic called set theory. Set theory fulfills this role because goodness, the fundamental phenomenon of ethics, is defined axiomatically in terms of sets. The similarity of structure between certain elements of set theory and the various types and degrees of goodness makes mathematical accounting of goodness phenomena possible. (...) In the valuemetrics context, value judgments are considered as an assessment of the goodness of something. Therefore, the mathematical system for the accounting of goodness serves as a tool for objectively making many kinds of value judgments and possible attendant ethical decisions. One of the results of this conception, attributable to Hartman, is the birth of the science of ethics. The first half of the book elucidates the theory, terminology, and mathematical system used in valuemetrics, known as Hartmanean algebra. The second half is devoted to the application of this system to the measurement and development of a person's value vision, and the solution of various problems in ethics using the case study technique. Hartmanean algebra will resolve several types of problems such as the determination of right and wrong, good and bad; determining how to redress and amend instances of wrongs and badness; and how to determine when, if ever, wrongs and badness are justified. (shrink)

In this important and timely study, Frank Kirkpatrick draws on theology, political philosophy and the social sciences more generally to develop a Christian ethic of community.

Argumentation as the public exchange of reasons is widely thought to enhance deliberative interactions that generate and justify reasonable public policies. Adopting an argumentation-theoretic perspective, we survey the norms that should govern public argumentation and address some of the complexities that scholarly treatments have identified. Our focus is on norms associated with the ideals of correctness and participation as sources of a politically legitimate deliberative outcome. In principle, both ideals are mutually coherent. If the information needed for a correct deliberative (...) outcome is distributed among agents, then maximising participation increases information diversity. But both ideals can also be in tension. If participants lack competence or are prone to biases, a correct deliberative outcome requires limiting participation. The central question for public argumentation, therefore, is how to strike a balance between both ideals. Rather than advocating a preferred normative framework, our main purpose is to illustrate the complexity of this theme. (shrink)

This paper articulates the commitments, contours and justifications for a pluralist but non-eclectic critical, realist, reflexive social science with emancipatory aims. In it, we stress that social science can and should be used to guide the conceptualization of desirable and viable forms of social organization and their conditions of realization. In this regard, we advocate explanatory theorizing as an ethical duty of social scientists and as a moral good in itself as well as being an inherent epistemological component of scientific (...) practice. This entails that we take seriously the research strategies apposite to our disciplinary, intertextual and interdiscursive locations to make a serious theoretical case and practical case for the kind of social science here advocated. In our view, such a social science must acknowledge the path-breaking work of Roy Bhaskar, but must also recognize that the arguments deployed in texts as a resource in intellectual work can never be treated as the axiomatic grounds for further thought, but must be interrogated thoroughly and in each case what is to be retained must be defensible. No position has a monopoly of relevant insights and the development of science often involves syntheses. Syntheses must not be syncretic but reflexively interrogated to assess epistemological, ontological and conceptual coherence to avoid eclecticism. Development in critical realist philosophy will, we believe, continue to confront and offer plausible resolutions to a range of battles within and pertinent to philosophy and social-scientific metatheory. However, realists must recognize the continuing importance and discursive effects of a variety of critical and realist work in being able to defend, sustain and develop rigorous social-scientific research with emancipatory commitments. (shrink)

An attempt to show that the judgments of aesthetics are both objective and relative. The sense in which they are objective is established by reference to sartre's account of husserl's theory of intentionality. The key concept here is the non-Ecological nature of consciousness. On this view value predicates refer to the properties of objects. Such properties have certain presuppositions. Drawing on discussions by john laird and j.N. Findlay it is argued that a property is justified when its presuppositions are confirmed. (...) It is also argued that a property is appropriate at one level when its presuppositions are of a certain type and appropriate at a higher level when the type of presupposition can itself be characterized in certain specific ways. These ways are those built into the terms used to express or refer to the property in question. Since such terms are sociocultural objects they are tied to particular times and places. For this reason all aesthetic judgments are relative. This, However, Does not destroy their objectivity. (shrink)